









 Problem solving is central to mathematics. Yet problem‐solving skill is not what  it  seems.  Indeed,  the  field  of  problem  solving  has  recently  undergone  a surge in research interest and insight but many of the results of this research are both  counter‐intuitive  and  contrary  to  many  widely  held  views.  For  example, many  educators  assume  that  general  problem‐solving  strategies  are  not  only learnable  and  teachable  but  are  a  critical  adjunct  to mathematical  knowledge. The  best  known  exposition  of  this  view  was  provided  by  Polya  (1957).  He discussed  a  range  of  general  problem‐solving  strategies,  such  as  encouraging mathematics students  to  think of a  related problem and  then solve  the current problem by analogy or to think of a simpler problem and then extrapolate to the current problem. The examples Polya used to demonstrate his problem‐solving strategies are  fascinating and his  influence probably can be sourced, at  least  in part, to those examples. Nevertheless, in over a half century, no systematic body of  evidence  demonstrating  the  effectiveness  of  any  general  problem‐solving strategies has emerged. It  is possible to teach learners to use general strategies such  as  those  suggested  by  Polya  (Schoenfeld,  1985)  but  that  is  insufficient. There  is  no  body  of  research  based  on  randomized,  controlled  experiments indicating that such teaching leads to better problem solving. Recent  'reform'  curricula both  ignore  the absence of  supporting data  and completely  misunderstand  the  role  of  problem  solving  in  cognition.  If,  the argument  goes,  we  are  not  really  teaching  people mathematics  but  rather  are teaching them some form of general problem solving, then mathematical content can be reduced in importance. According to this argument, we can teach students how to solve problems in general and that will make them good mathematicians able to discover novel solutions irrespective of the content.  We  believe  this  argument  ignores  all  the  empirical  evidence  about mathematics  learning. While  some mathematicians,  in  the absence of  adequate instruction,  may  have  learned  to  solve  mathematics  problems  by  discovering solutions without explicit guidance,  this approach was never  the most effective or efficient way to learn mathematics.   The  alternative  route  to  acquiring  problem‐solving  skill  in  mathematics derives  from  the  work  of  a  Dutch  psychologist,  De  Groot  (1965/1946) investigating the source of skill in chess. Researching why chess masters always defeated  weekend  players,  De  Groot  managed  to  find  only  one  difference.  He showed masters and weekend players a board configuration  from a  real game, removed  it  after  5  seconds  and  asked  them  to  reproduce  the  board.  Masters could do so with an accuracy rate of about 70% compared to 30% for weekend 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players.  Chase  and  Simon  (1973)  replicated  these  results  and  additionally demonstrated  that  when  the  experiment  was  repeated  with  random configurations  rather  than  real‐game  configurations,  masters  and  weekend players  had  equal  accuracy  (±30%).  Masters  were  superior  only  for configurations taken from real games. Chess  is  a problem‐solving game whose  rules  can be  learned  in  about 30 minutes.  Yet  it  takes  at  least  10  years  to  become  a  chess master. What  occurs during  this  period?  When  studying  previous  games,  chess  masters  learn  to recognise  tens  of  thousands  of  board  configurations  and  the  best  moves associated with each configuration (Simon & Gilmartin, 1973). The superiority of chess  masters  comes  not  from  having  acquired  clever,  sophisticated,  general, problem‐solving  strategies  but  rather  from  having  stored  innumerable configurations and the best moves associated with each in long‐term memory.  De  Groot’s  results  have  been  replicated  in  a  variety  of  educationally relevant fields, including mathematics (Sweller & Cooper, 1985). They tell us that long‐term memory, a critical component of human cognitive architecture, is not used  to  store  random,  isolated  facts,  but  rather  to  store  huge  complexes  of closely  integrated  information that results  in problem‐solving skill. That skill  is knowledge domain‐specific, not domain‐general. An experienced problem solver in  any  domain  has  constructed  and  stored  huge  numbers  of  schemas  in  long‐term memory that allow problems in that domain to be categorised according to their  solution  moves.  In short, the research suggests that we can teach aspiring 
mathematicians to be effective problem solvers only by providing them with a large 
store of domain-specific schemas. Mathematical problem-solving skill is acquired 
through a large number of specific mathematical problem-solving strategies relevant 
to particular problems. There are no separate, general problem‐solving strategies that can be learned. How do people solve problems that they have not previously encountered? Most  employ  a  version  of  means‐ends  analysis  where  differences  between  a current  problem‐state  and  goal‐state  are  identified  and  problem‐solving operators are  found  to  reduce  those differences. There  is no evidence  that  this strategy is teachable or learnable because we use it automatically.  But  domain‐specific  mathematical  problem‐solving  skills  can  be  taught. How?  One  simple  answer  is  by  emphasising  worked  examples  of  problem solution strategies. There is now a large body of evidence showing that studying worked  examples  is  a  more  effective  and  efficient  way  of  learning  to  solve problems  than  simply practicing problem‐solving without  reference  to worked examples  (Paas & van Gog, 2006).  Studying worked examples  interleaved with practice  solving  the  type  of  problem  described  in  the  example  reduces unnecessary working memory  load  that  prevents  the  transfer  of  knowledge  to long‐term  memory.  The  improvement  in  subsequent  problem‐solving performance  after  studying  worked  examples  rather  than  solving  problems  is known as the worked‐example effect (Paas & van Gog).  While  a  lack  of  empirical  evidence  supporting  the  teaching  of  general problem‐solving  strategies  in  mathematics  is  telling,  there  is  ample  empirical evidence  of  the  validity  of  the  worked‐example  effect.  A  large  number  of randomised,  controlled  experiments  demonstrate  this  effect  (e.g.  Schwonke  et al.,  2009;  Sweller  &  Cooper,  1985).  For  novice  mathematics  learners,  the evidence  is  overwhelming  that  studying worked  examples  rather  than  solving 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the equivalent problems facilitates learning. Studying worked examples is a form of direct, explicit instruction that is vital in all curriculum areas, especially areas that  many  students  find  difficult  and  that  are  critical  to  modern  societies. Mathematics is such a discipline. Minimal instructional guidance in mathematics leads to minimal learning (Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006). 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